Spotlight on security for national aid workers: Issues and perspectives
Key findings

- The past two years show a downturn in violence against aid workers that spiked in a small number of conflict contexts beginning in 2006 and peaking in 2008.

- The recent decline in attacks is mainly due to the shrinking presence of international aid agencies in the most violent settings, Somalia in particular, rather than improving security conditions.

- The incidence of aid worker kidnappings continues to rise dramatically, and the use of major explosives has emerged as a tactic of violence in a small number of settings.

- Despite overall improvements in aid agencies’ security risk management, national aid workers perceive continued inequities in security support compared with their international counterparts.

- National aid workers, while less subject to major attacks per capita than international aid workers, nevertheless form the majority of victims, and their specific security needs require more attention.
### Major attacks on aid workers: Summary statistics, 2000-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
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<td>106</td>
<td>119</td>
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<td>129</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total aid worker victims</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total killed</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total injured</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total kidnapped*</td>
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<td>International victims</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>National victims</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>173</td>
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<td>UN staff</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>International NGO staff</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>121</td>
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<td>143</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUNGO and RCS staff**</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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</table>

* Live release or escape (kidnappings where victims were killed are counted in the ‘killed’ totals)

** Local (host country) non-governmental organisations and National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies

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### Introductory note

The Aid Worker Security Report 2011 is the third in a series of briefing papers monitoring trends and issues in security for humanitarian operations that base findings on data from the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD). The AWSD tracks reports of major incidents of violence against aid workers worldwide, including killings, kidnappings and armed attacks that result in serious injury. Aid workers are defined as the personnel of UN humanitarian agencies, Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, and NGOs with programmes in humanitarian contexts (see a detailed methodology description at the end of this paper). The authors originated the AWSD and analytical methodology in 2004, under a collaborative project of the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) and the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) called Providing Aid in Insecure Environments. The AWSD is now a project of Humanitarian Outcomes, an independent research group that maintains collaborative affiliations with HPG and CIC. In 2010, an online version of the database was launched to allow free public access to the data, made possible by grants from the governments of Canada, Ireland, and the United States.

In addition to presenting an updated analysis of statistical trends, the Aid Worker Security Report 2011 highlights the issue of security for national aid workers, drawing upon findings from a major survey of national aid workers conducted for a recent OCHA-commissioned study: To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard 2011).
1.1 Fewer attacks in 2009 and 2010

The year 2008 marked a high point in the absolute number of attacks against civilian humanitarian operations. In that year, more aid workers were killed, kidnapped and seriously wounded than at any other point since data have been recorded: 276 victims in 165 separate attacks. As reported in the last (2009) AWSD briefing paper, this surge in violence was driven primarily by a handful of particularly violent settings and was coloured by a growing politicisation of attacks, where aid workers were increasingly being targeted by militants for their association with Western military and political campaigns (Stoddard, Harmer and DiDomenico 2009).

Although it is too soon to say whether the downward trend will continue, the number of major attacks reported against humanitarians dropped noticeably over the past two years. In 2010 there were 26 per cent fewer attacks, with 13 per cent fewer individual victims, compared with the peak period of violence two years prior, in 2008.

Although fewer casualties could be seen as a hopeful indicator – either that violence was abating or that aid agencies have improved their security management – for reasons we elaborate below, the drop in incidents in the last two years is less of a positive sign than it might first appear. Incidents have gone down in two of the three most violent settings, south-central Somalia and Darfur, Sudan, where the aid presence has recently diminished significantly because of insecurity and, in the case of Sudan, the government has restricted access to areas of active conflict. Iraq, another formerly high-incident context, has seen few attacks in recent years, largely due to the continued low presence of most international agencies. Many withdrew several years ago as the result of the violence and have only recently begun to return (in a low-profile capacity). Simply stated, in these places, fewer aid workers are on the ground to be attacked. The reduced aid presence in these areas has meant that many conflict-affected civilians have lost access to critically needed humanitarian aid.

1.2 Casualty figures still driven by a small number of operational settings

The upsurge in attacks beginning in 2006 and peaking in 2008 was concentrated in a small number of highly violent environments, and this remained the case in 2009 and 2010. In 2009 and 2010, international humanitarian assistance activities took place in roughly 130 countries,1 in response to situations ranging from small-scale natural disasters to large, ongoing complex
crises. Major attacks against aid workers were reported in 32 of these countries during those two years. However, the majority of these attacks (67 per cent) took place in just five countries: Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.\(^2\) Afghanistan has had far and away the largest number of incidents in the last several years.

Figure 2: Highest incident contexts, 2009–10

The distribution of incidents shows that a few highly dangerous settings, characterised by protracted armed conflict and antipathy toward an international humanitarian presence perceived as Western-aligned, continue to drive overall trends in attack numbers. In many other operational settings, including those marked by high crime or societal disruption in the aftermath of natural disasters, major incidents were relatively rare. This is a testament to improved security management throughout the humanitarian community.

1.3 Surging violence in Afghanistan, shrinking humanitarian presence in Somalia and Sudan

Because the majority of incidents take place in a small number of operational settings, we must look to these contexts first for the drivers of new trends. The data show that the most striking changes in 2009 and 2010 took place in three countries: Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan. In Afghanistan the number of major attacks recorded by the AWSD sharply increased in during this time, while it decreased in Somalia and Sudan. The decrease in incidents in these two countries was mainly in ambushes, shootings and armed raids, although in Darfur kidnappings remained a growing problem.

Notably, incident reporting has greatly improved in Afghanistan due to the work of the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), which has become very effective at providing security briefings and tracking incidents. By contrast, this kind of field-level interagency security mechanism has not been established in Sudan, and a similar but less successful mechanism in Somalia (the NGO Safety Program, or NSP) has only recently begun to re-vamp its criteria for incident tracking. In addition, humanitarian actors in Sudan allege that disincentives to reporting incidents of crime exist, and they are intimidated with fear of government reprisals. Therefore, the AWSD is likely recording more incidents in Afghanistan, especially those affecting local NGOs and local staff, than it is in Somalia and Sudan. This difference in the quality of reporting appears to account for only a small portion of the difference in the three countries, however. Even if all incidents against local NGOs in Afghanistan in 2010 were excluded, for example, Afghanistan would still have seen more incidents than Somalia and Sudan that year. This illustrates that the increasing violence in Afghanistan, and the decreasing violence in Sudan and Somalia, likely reflects real trends on the ground, and not just better reporting.

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2 Sri Lanka represents an exceptional case, however, because the aid worker casualties were predominantly caused by shelling during the Sri Lankan government’s military operations against the LTTE during 2009. No major violent incidents against aid workers occurred for Sri Lanka in 2010.
The data show that the most significant drop in total attacks was in Somalia, where major violent incidents against aid workers decreased by 84 per cent from 2008 to 2010, followed by Sudan, which saw a decrease of 58 per cent in the same period (see Figure 3). If the aid worker population was static, the decrease in incidents could indicate improved security conditions for aid workers in these contexts. Unfortunately, all evidence points to the cause being fewer humanitarian workers in these areas, and greater restrictions on the movement and activities of those remaining, rather than increased peace and security. Although obtaining precise numbers for the total humanitarian staff presence in these countries from 2008 to 2010 was not possible, proxy indicators show that the humanitarian presence and programming has gone down on the same order of magnitude as the reduction in violent attacks.

In Somalia in 2008, 51 major attacks left 45 aid workers dead. This unprecedented high level of violence against humanitarian operations caused international humanitarian agencies to significantly restrict their operations and withdraw international staff from the south-central region, where the violence predominantly occurs (all but three of the 78 major attacks against aid workers in Somalia between 2008 and 2010 took place in the southern and central provinces). UN and international NGO staff in south-central Somalia was reduced by 45 per cent (OCHA Somalia Access Reports 2008–20103), and project activities in the south-central region dropped by roughly half (OCHA FTS4) over the same period. Most of the remaining staff are Somali diaspora or Kenyans operating in Mogadishu or on the Kenya-Somalia border, who have very restricted movement (some only fly in and out on day trips). Most of their programming is done through local partners at a reduced level of activity within a limited geographical area. The sudden decision of the World Food Programme to suspend operations in 2010, citing prohibitive insecurity, created the largest-scale reduction ever in humanitarian operations in the country. At the same time, the United States government, formerly the largest humanitarian donor to the country, cut its humanitarian contributions to Somalia by 89 per cent (OCHA FTS5). Despite the existence of a Somali NGO sector, it is reasonable to assume that dramatic decreases in international funding for aid projects in the south-central region will have a strong cascading effect and reduce the number of aid activities and staff among local organisations.5

In Sudan, since 2008, the international aid presence has significantly diminished in Darfur, where the majority of attacks have taken place. The Sudanese government’s expulsion of 13 major international NGOs in March 2009 (10 of which were working in Darfur and were estimated to account for a large percentage of assistance), as well as increasing risks following a spate of high-profile international-staff kidnappings in 2009–10 and a resurgence of international-staff expulsions in 2010 were partially responsible for this reduction. While still among the largest humanitarian efforts in the world, the now-smaller humanitarian footprint in Sudan is reflected

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4 http://fts.unocha.org/
5 At the time of publication a large scale relief effort was building up in response to the the drought and conflict in Somalia. It is unclear, however, if this will change the previous restrictions imposed on aid staff’s movement in the south-central region, and to what extent national and international staff might be exposed to greater risks.
in lower funding and fewer project activities. This is due in part to government restrictions on foreign humanitarian activity across the Darfur region and increased targeting of aid workers in remote locations. Increasingly international staffers are kept concentrated in state capitals and their movement out to the field is restricted.

Table 1: Somalia indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2008-10</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on aid workers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN and NGO international staff in the south-central region</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian funding contributions</td>
<td>$355M</td>
<td>$317M</td>
<td>$196M</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project activities in the south-central region</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Sudan indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2008-10</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on aid workers</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN and NGO international staff</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian funding contributions</td>
<td>$1,306M</td>
<td>$1,213M</td>
<td>$1,050M</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project activities</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Aid Worker Security Database, OCHA FTS

Since 2008, major attacks against aid workers in Afghanistan have increased by 97 per cent. Formerly stable areas in the northern half of the country have seen increased violence as the Taliban made gains in the civil conflict. ANSO reports the strongest rise was in abductions, in particular of national staff, for the apparent purpose of information-gathering and with most victims released within a few days. ANSO notes that armed opposition groups are increasingly attacking demining organisations, particularly in the southern provinces, because they are opposed to this type of work (ANSO 2010).

Reliable figures for the total aid worker population in Afghanistan are not available. However, using funding flows as a proxy, the increase in serious attacks clearly cannot be explained by any increase in the overall aid-worker presence. On the contrary, international organisations report having pulled back staff from deep field locations where violence is escalating and concentrating aid personnel in the provincial capitals (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard 2011).

To summarise, while serious violence against aid workers did indeed ramp up in Afghanistan, the reduction in attacks in the other two countries correlates strongly with the reduced humanitarian presence in the insecure areas of south-central Somalia and the Darfur region of Sudan.

Table 3: Afghanistan indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2008-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on aid workers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian funding contributions to Afghanistan</td>
<td>$329M</td>
<td>$482M</td>
<td>$427M</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Aid Worker Security Database, OCHA FTS
1.4 After peak, UN and international staff attack rates decline in 2010

Although national staffers make up the majority of victims in attacks on aid operations, the data show that, per capita, international aid workers generally face a higher rate of attacks. This became more pronounced during the peak in violence in 2008, and in 2009, several large attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan drove the rate of violence against international staff to the highest levels recorded. Data on perpetrators and motives supported the hypothesis that aid worker attacks have become increasingly politicised in conflict environments such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and Pakistan, as aid providers are seen as associated with Western political and military agendas. In reaction to the increased threats in these settings, international agencies have restricted international staff movements in high-threat areas, mandated air travel rather than road travel in many cases, consolidated residences and offices in protected compounds and increasingly managed programmes remotely, with local staff or local partners carrying out aid activities.

Most likely in part due to these measures, the rate of international staff attacks for humanitarian agencies dropped steeply in 2010, commensurate with an overall drop in attacks. For national staff, the rate of violence also decreased in 2010 for those working for the UN, while it remained more or less stable for those working with the largest international NGOs. See the following section for more detail.

When the relative rates of violence are examined for different organisational affiliations, we see that 2009 was notable for a high attack rate for UN humanitarian staff and a relatively lower rate for international NGOs (INGOs). (Rates of violence were computed for a subset of the largest INGOs, for which figures on the number of field staff were more readily available, numbering around two dozen.) Several high-casualty attacks affecting UN staff took place in 2009, including the Pearl Hotel bombing in Peshawar, the bombing of WFP's office in Islamabad, and the armed raid on the UN guest house in Kabul. These drove up UN aid workers' relative rate of victims per 10,000 staff in the field in 2009. These attacks occurred in settings where
the UN has been explicitly named as a target by militant groups and where the use of explosives and complex attacks (for example, a vehicle-borne IED used to blast a way in, followed by suicide bombers and armed men in a second and third wave) have become evident in the last couple of years. These trends in tactics are discussed more below.

In the comparative graph (Figure 5), note that the UN rate includes only UN humanitarian agency employees and not the personnel of contracted companies, such as truck drivers, who comprise a large percentage of violent-incident victims. Even so, the UN rate rose dramatically vis-à-vis that of INGOs in 2009.

**1.5 Tactics: The rise in kidnappings and the use of major explosives**

Recent trends in tactics reflect the heightened protection measures focused on international staff. For the first time since AWSD data has been recorded, the number of ambushes or attacks on the road has fallen below other tactics of violence used in attacks on aid workers. More restrictions on staff movement, particularly for internationals, greater use of air travel and more static, localised programming explain this trend in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia.

Of all means of violence recorded in aid worker attacks, two stand alone as on the rise: kidnappings and the use of major explosives, including roadside, vehicle and body-borne IEDs. In 2010, these tactics proliferated in two countries in particular: Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The nearly four-fold rise in kidnappings since 2005, that continues even as incidents in general have fallen off, speaks to the multiple incentives it offers in economic gains and political leverage.

![Figure 5: Rate of violence for UN and INGO (subset) staff, 2000-2009](image-url)

*Includes incidents where victims were killed*
The policy analysis portion of this briefing paper focuses on the operational security issues for national staff and national partner organisations, drawing from a recent study commissioned by OCHA on good practice for humanitarians in complex security environments. That research included a multi-language web-based survey of national aid workers in complex security environments to elicit their perspectives on key issues regarding their security. (More detail on the survey can be found in ‘Note on data definitions and methodology’ at the end of this report.) This section also draws on a series of interviews that we conducted to complement the survey findings and assess some of the broader policy and operational implications.

2.1 Background and definitions

Why the issue is important

National aid workers constitute the majority of aid staff in the field – upwards of 90 per cent for most international NGOs – and undertake the bulk of the work in assisting beneficiary populations. Although the statistics show that international (expatriate) aid workers have a higher per capita rate as victims of violent attacks, the national staffers, because of their higher numbers and greater exposure in frontline field positions, comprise the vast majority of victims every year. This fact alone should be enough to place the safety and security of national aid workers at the highest level of an organisation’s priorities.

The issue of national aid worker security is becoming critical for humanitarian agencies and their donors for several reasons, including the declining access for international staff in some high-risk contexts and increasing reliance on national staff and local partners to remain where international staff have left. Host state restrictions on international staff movement and, in their most extreme form, expulsion of international agencies (such as in Sudan in early 2009) have increased the need for effective partnering between international and national aid organisations (ICVA 2010). This coincides with a growing professionalism within the humanitarian security sector and recognition that the inter-dependent nature of humanitarian work requires all agencies operating in highly insecure contexts to better appreciate good practices and minimum standards in security risk management (HPN 2010, InterAction 2010).

Who are ‘national’ aid workers?

National aid workers are defined here as paid personnel working on assistance programming in their home countries. This includes both the national staff of international organisations and the personnel of local or national aid organisations.

International organisations have classically referred to ‘national’ and ‘international’ as their two main categories of staff but multiple distinctions can exist within these terms. ‘International
staff’ refers to all staff not from the country within which they are working. In addition to Western expatriate staff, an organisation’s international staff often is made up of a range of nationalities, including those from neighbouring countries and those who were previously national staff in another country. International staff are generally all employed under the same terms and conditions of employment.

‘National staff’ can encompass a range of hiring categories that can stipulate different terms and conditions of employment. Increasingly organisations differentiate between local staff, hired directly from the area that they work, and national staff, nationals of the country but not from the duty station locale. In this paper, we use the terms ‘local staff’ and ‘nationally-relocated staff’ to distinguish between these two. In many organisations, local staff have different terms of employment, compared with their relocatable counterparts. Further, some organisations, including the UN agencies, will have different contracting arrangements, benefits and career tracks for nationals hired for ‘professional’ positions and those hired for general services and administration. Like in many NGOs, UN national staff can serve in senior management positions and ultimately become international staff working in other countries.

Duty of care and responsible partnership

Distinguishing between the levels of legal and ethical responsibility that international organisations bear toward national aid workers is important. Organisations have a direct duty of care for the national staff they employ in matters of safety and security, among other things. This legal obligation does not extend to the personnel of local partner NGOs, even if the partner is a direct subcontractor of the international organisation. However, few would dispute that an ethical obligation to the local partner organisation exists that, while less clearly defined, becomes more important as security conditions deteriorate and local NGO partners take on greater programme implementation as a result.

In the past, inadequate attention to the security needs of national aid workers was often based on certain false assumptions, for instance, that a national staffer will be able to work securely anywhere in the country because he or she does not stand out as being visibly foreign. In truth, of course, locals may perceive nationals from another region or province to be just as much of an outsider, and their association with certain ethnic or religious groups, clan affiliation or economic privilege may even put them at additional risk. Organisations are slowly beginning to emphasise the different types of risks faced by national aid workers.

Duty of care and legal liability for national staff and local partner organisations have recently become topics of interest to international aid organisations, indicating a growing acknowledgment of the need to take national-staff security more seriously at the corporate level (Finucane 2011). Potentially soaring personnel costs and other organisational disincentives hinder this effort, however, as will be discussed below.

5 The legal concept of duty of care presumes that organisations ‘are responsible for their employees’ well-being and must take practical steps to mitigate foreseeable workplace dangers’—a responsibility that takes on additional implications when the employees are working overseas (Claus 2010).
Past and current initiatives to address these issues

This is not the first study to examine the issue of security for national aid workers, but surprisingly few comprehensive analyses exist of their role in highly insecure contexts, given the importance of the topic. A decade ago in 2001, InterAction produced an important resource, The Security of National Staff: Towards Good Practices (Fawcett and Tanner 2001) and a number of institutional security guides for national staff have been prepared, such as one by ICRC and IFRC for their national societies (Leach and Hofstetter 2004). More recently, studies have looked at security-coordination issues between national and international humanitarian actors (Christian Aid 2010, HPN 2010). Past studies have noted the discrepancies between national and international staff in terms of access to security training, physical security measures for residences and vehicles, and telecommunications equipment (Stoddard, Harmer and Haver 2006). This study attempts to go further by documenting the perspectives of national aid workers and examining how these perspectives relate to ongoing policy initiatives. It attempts to distinguish between what is seen as a growing organisational rhetoric towards supporting national aid workers and a less positive reality.

2.2 Differing perceptions of risk

One of the primary objectives of the survey was to explore the perceptions of national aid workers on the types of threats and level of risk they face in their work and whether they perceive these threats and risks differently than their international counterparts.

Survey questions regarding risk

The survey asked national staff respondents a range of questions related to their perceptions of risk and relative to international staff, including this sample:

- How would you rate the security of your local work environment for aid operations?
- Has access (due to deteriorating security) declined for aid operations in your local work environment?
- What is the greatest (most prevalent) source of threat facing aid personnel and assets in your environment?
- In your environment, which jobs carry the most risk?
- Do international staff perceive local security conditions differently than national staff? If so, in your opinion do they generally overestimate or underestimate the risk?

The survey was targeted to national aid workers in conflict-affected operational settings considered more insecure or higher risk. Only those respondents from the most-extreme security environments - Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia - defined their conditions as ‘somewhat’ to ‘highly’ insecure and were more likely to perceive humanitarian access as declining (as opposed to improving or staying the same) because of insecurity. The rest of the respondents, even those from the remaining ten highest-incident countries such as the DRC, Chad and Haiti, assessed the current conditions in their operational environments as ‘mostly secure’, defined as ‘a few isolated acts of violence, but no specific targeting’.

The context in which the national aid workers were operating also dictated their identification of the most serious or prevalent types of threats. The findings are consistent with the incident records in those contexts. In the contexts of Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan and Somalia, for example, respondents ranked the top two threats to aid operations as suicide bombings and kidnapping. In DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), Chad and Sudan, the top two threats were car-jacking and common crime. In oPt (occupied Palestinian territories) and Sri Lanka, the chief concerns were armed raids and collateral violence from combat operations.

A majority of survey respondents felt that national aid workers do indeed perceive security risk differently than their international counterparts. Most felt that internationals tended to overestimate the risk in the local security environment. Length of time in the operational context can partly explain this. National aid workers generally have more longevity in their positions in-country, compared with international staff, who typically rotate in and out of insecure contexts in less than two years.6 This experience combined with having a local frame of reference, so crucial for informing an organisation’s security strategy, may also account in part for local staff’s relatively more sanguine outlook on security and access conditions in their countries. International staff and security managers acknowledge that a gap exists between them and their local staff and partners in how they perceive security risks. Many of them cite additional, less positive explanations for why this is. They refer to the ‘frog in the pot’ syndrome, where individuals become inured to chronic violence in their environment and come to view it as normal. Many international aid workers also cite the related tendency for some national staffers to take a more passive and fatalistic approach to their own safety and security.

As described above, incident statistics show that international staffers have a higher rate of attacks relative to their numbers in the field. The field-level perspective of national staff, however, was at odds with the statistical reality. A majority of national staffers (57 per cent) were of the opinion that nationals were generally more at risk than internationals. In survey comments and interviews, however, many nationals made the important distinction between the risk faced by national staff who are more exposed (are out in the field, travelling by road, living without additional security precautions at home) versus the risk faced by international staff who are targeted as foreigners and subject to politically-motivated violence from those with animosity and mistrust toward the West. Only in the occupied Palestinian territories did the national staff survey respondents show a consensus that they, as Palestinians, faced greater risk than their international counterparts, due to the threats against them from Israeli military forces (and, in the West Bank, from settlers). International staff interviewees strongly supported this view.

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6 A majority of survey respondents reported serving more than three years with their organisations, and nearly a quarter had served for more than five.
Interviewees also highlighted that national aid workers – whether staff of international organisations, or partners – may have incentives to downplay the threats they face and accept imprudent levels of risk to safeguard their jobs and livelihoods, which depend on the organisation continuing its work. Interviewees stressed the need for organisations to address these concerns – primarily by training staff to understand that by reporting all possible threats, organisations can put in place reduction and mitigation measures which ultimately may save the programme and, therefore, much-needed employment.

2.3 Staff care: Disparate levels of security capacity and support

Previous research has identified a disparity between the level of security support provided to national as compared to international aid actors (Stoddard, Harmer and Haver 2006). To understand this disparity and the extent to which the gap has been closing in recent years, the survey explored a range of issues regarding how well employing organisations have fulfilled their security responsibilities vis-à-vis their national staff.

Positively, a majority of national aid-worker survey respondents across all institutional types reported that their organisations’ attention to their security needs has improved. The UN – which states that it offers a comprehensive approach to all staff through the UN’s Security Management System – fared best; their staff reported having received some training (which they noted as very welcome and useful) and being aware of organisational security policies and procedures. INGOs rated a bit lower, and local NGOs the lowest of all, with only slightly more than half of respondents affirming the existence of policies and a majority reporting having received no security training at all. Regarding the adequacy of available resources for security, 60 per cent of UN national staff respondents rated the level of resources as ‘good’ to ‘excellent’, while majorities of NGO staff (both national and international) rated their

Survey questions regarding levels of security capacity and support

- Did you receive security training during the time you have been employed by your organisation?
- How do you rate the level of resources (training, equipment, funding) that your organisation provides for staff security?
resource level as ‘fair’ to ‘poor’. A number of survey respondents commented on the lack of communications training and equipment, despite the stated importance of these assets by international organisations.

The potential burgeoning cost to organisations seeking to extend a more equitable level of support and benefits to their national staff, or more resources to national organisational partners, is a major factor in why disparities have not been addressed as fast or as comprehensively as they should be. In addition, prevailing economic conditions and local labour norms can provide organisations with a rationale to follow local norms rather than seek greater equity between international and national staff. For instance, if no other employer provides health or other benefits, and if nationals in local industries typically earn relatively low wages compared to what the international organisation pays, that organisation will feel little pressure to offer local staff employment terms that are on par with their expatriate staff. It should be emphasised that this reticence does not characterise all international agencies, and a few of the larger ones are beginning deliberate steps to raise standards in their local operational environments rather than follow the customary practices.

In summary, the survey findings suggest that most national aid workers see an international aid system that at times exaggerates the security risk, but which focuses its resources for mitigating that risk on its international staff members – not the national aid workers who are more often, in their own view, subjected to violence. International organisations clearly have an interest in bridging this keenly felt divide for practical and ethical reasons.

### 2.4 Organisational policies and approaches to duty of care

To augment the survey findings, the authors interviewed a range of agencies at headquarters regarding their human-resource and security policies for national staff. Here we found that although the rhetoric suggests little or no distinctions in treatment between national and international staff, differences in approach to security for international and national staff remain.

The larger organisations tend to have more developed corporate policies for national staff, covering areas such as medical care, insurance and other benefits. Save the Children US, for example, allocates security inputs according to the job function, not by staff type. Certain senior staffers, such as the head of a field office, for instance, will require 24-hour access to vehicles and communications equipment regardless of whether they are nationals or expatriates. Staffers who have been relocated outside their home area will receive home leave or emergency transport to return if necessary, whether that means international evacuation or in-country travel. Yet in all cases national staff receive less coverage and compensation than international staff, primarily because their entitlements are linked to their salaries (which are generally much lower and in line with the local economy) or reflect the local labour laws. Generally, differentials exist in terms of entitlements. Most agencies’
policies, for example, do not extend R&R leave to national staff, although a few examples were found of nationally-relocated staff receiving periodic home leave back to their place of hire. As an example of good practice, some agencies provide national staff with bonuses, which essentially mirror the hardship or hazard allowances offered to international staff.

Other forms of support include medical coverage. If no functional national insurance sector exists in the location, agencies will self-insure or find other ways to assist national staff and their dependents with health care, disability or bereavement costs. Only very rarely would such plans extend to medical evacuation, however. On the thorny issue of evacuation of nationals in general, policies are fairly consistent: nationals cannot be evacuated from the country for reasons of severe insecurity, as internationals are. Agencies want to avoid creating refugees, and cite the difficult questions that would arise of evacuating staff members’ dependents as well, or of supporting them if they are left behind. In the event of an evacuation of international staff, many organisations help nationally-relocated staff return to the point of hire or an alternate (in-country) relocation, and some organisations provide national staff with two-to-three months advance salary and access to vehicles and communications equipment.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that crisis management and kidnap-and-ransom (K&R) insurance varies considerably regarding their application to national staff, although the issue is generally not openly discussed. Providing an accurate assessment of coverage for national staff is difficult.

Organisations are increasingly considering whether to provide additional security protection for nationals’ residences. Some interviewees argue that this is not helpful, since it risks raising the profile of national staff and, rather than making them safer, might make them more of a target. Others note however that in some contexts national staff are a potential target of political or economic violence anyway, once they are identified as working for an international (often perceived as Western) organisation, and they receive salaries often far above the national average. In some cases, agencies differentiate between relocated and local staff, and only protect the residences of the former, arguing that they are not responsible to protect local staff from violence that may be unrelated to their work for the agency. The bigger issue remains the significant cost implications. As an example, in South Africa where staff are exposed to high levels of criminality, one organisation spends $26,000 per international staff member for security measures. If this were to extend to the organisation’s 100 national staff, the programme funds spent on security would shift from 15 per cent to close to 30 per cent.

The issue of addressing stress and trauma among national staff in highly insecure conditions is receiving increased policy attention of late, particularly after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, although finding the money to pay for it is proving harder. A number of interviewees conveyed the challenges of ensuring national staff are aware of counselling services, where they are available. In Cote d’Ivoire for example, one national staff noted,

“Local staff are not very well treated here. Since the start of the crisis, if a local staff member gets into trouble, no-one is available to go and help them ... I am not aware of any counselling services available to local staff in the agency I work with (IRIN 2011).”
The funding challenges for psychosocial support and mental health care stem partly from their dependence on programme funds, rather than institutional funding not linked to any specific crisis. Very few agencies have specialised staff-care units, for example Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was the only agency identified with such a facility, but some have established staff counsellor posts or draw on programme funds to hire expert consultants. Agencies also note the challenge of identifying skilled and experienced counsellors who are able to work in the appropriate local language. While translators can help with language barriers, they too need to be trained to some degree to deal with the issues they face through this role.

People in Aid, an organisation promoting good practice in the management of people in the aid sector, argues that part of the wider problem in addressing duty of care for staff in a more comprehensive manner is the weak link within organisations between security management and human resource professionals. Williamson (2010) encourages human resource staff to be more aware of security needs and costs in their operations, particularly for national staff, and vice versa. Aid organisations have tended to under-invest in human resourcing capacity and time on national staff issues. As an example, one INGO’s human resource department at one time had six to eight human resource professionals in headquarters dedicated to supporting its 200 international staffers in the field. In contrast, the same organisation had only one person assigned to national staff issues (part-time), despite employing thousands of national staff. Such a differential inevitably affects the quality of care and attention national staff security issues receive in terms of broad policy development and corporate care at the headquarters level.

2.5 Consultation and participation

Senior staff of aid agencies often stress that their security management is only as good as their national staff, whose full participation in security systems and decision-making is key. Indeed, most security focal points and, increasingly, security coordinator positions are now filled by national staff; the aid organisations interviewed in the field who demonstrated success in accessing affected populations in insecure settings all made strong use of their national colleagues’ (or partners’) information and analysis, consulted them as co-equals in security management, and often had nationals in senior leadership or analytical positions in the security area. The benefits include ‘responsibilising’ decision-making, increasing security awareness, and building relationships with local authorities and others, including armed actors, in the community. However, survey respondents noted some tensions on this issue. A number of respondents expressed feelings of not being listened to by international colleagues who ‘project themselves as the experts’.

In the survey, the majority of national aid workers from all types of organisations reported having a complaints mechanism in which issues of security could be raised and addressed (some more informal than others); however, not all were pleased with the outcome. As one respondent wrote, ‘We feel when we complain, the assessment team looks into our concerns and does a “tourist

Survey questions regarding consultation

• Do you regularly participate in security meetings and informational briefings?
• Does your organisation have a complaints mechanism in which you can raise issues of security?
• How is the communication on security issues between national and international staff?
kind” of assessment – they remain at the District HQ for example, talk[ing] to District Police Commander, Brigade Commander, but do not go deep in remote areas where field staff operate daily where this risk is high.’

In some countries, engaging national staff closely about the security dimensions of an organisation’s decision-making process (including information sharing between organisations) will raise the concerns of authorities. Agencies note that where the host state has a significant influence over the security apparatus for aid organisations, they must carefully weigh the benefits of inclusiveness against the risk this may pose for their nationals.

2.6 National aid organisations and the need for responsible partnership

The issue of addressing security needs and care for national partner organisations was described by one interviewee as taking the rhetoric-versus-reality problem one step further. That said, agencies (to varying degrees) are beginning to least consider what their responsibilities are to partners regarding their security and, linked to this, having a better understanding of their partners’ capacity to mitigate the threats and maintain their programming goals.

In response to deteriorating security conditions, many organisations opt to shift to a ‘remote management’ approach. This can include withdrawing international staff, altering management structures to give more responsibility to national and local staff who remain present, or working more with local partner organisations (HPN 2010). But, many aid organisations already routinely work with local partner organisations in a wide variety of settings, both secure and insecure. Organisations that decide to programme through local partners because of security constraints may believe that a partner organisation will face lower risks, simply because it is a national (rather than international) organisation. This should not be assumed, any more than it should be assumed that national staff of an international organisation would be at less risk.

Compared with others, partnership-based organisations demonstrated an earlier consciousness about providing security support to partner organisations. For example, Christian Aid and the ACT Alliance, which represents over 100 NGOs, have been examining their responsibilities for a number of years and have developed Staff Safety and Security Principles for the whole alliance – which reaches thousands of partners in the field – as well as hands-on training and training kits for all their partners. Multi-mandated but primarily development-oriented agencies often stress that partnership is core to their work, but they too identify challenges and weaknesses in their approach, particularly when they are engaged in responding to sudden-onset crises. In such circumstances, as one NGO experienced, it is possible to be caught short while trying to quickly scale up and, in the process, identify new partners without knowing or investing in their security capacities in advance of initiating the response effort. The humanitarian agencies that typically directly implement programmes and only rely on partner organisations when their access is limited acknowledge that they are behind in addressing the question of partnership and support to national partners and have only just begun to think about their responsibilities.
in this area. What was striking and common to all interviewees was the need to define the limits of their organisational responsibilities. Agencies’ chief concern is that formally acknowledging and addressing the issue of national partner security might put unmanageable pressures on their limited resources and capacity.

Some organisations have recently attempted to address their obligations and responsibilities (or limitations) in their security policies. For international organisations to adopt a policy position stating that local implementing partners are responsible for their own safety and security management is becoming increasingly common (Finucane 2011). Oxfam GB, for example, developed a new security policy in 2010 that states very clearly that Oxfam’s partners are responsible for managing their own security. Recently a few of the large UN agencies have started to more systematically review security measures, contingencies and capacity building with their implementing partners as a matter of policy and ongoing programme management.

Overall, however progress has been slow and not at the pace that the transfer of responsibility is taking place from the international organisation to the national partner. For many organisations, practice is not guided by any formal policy but is developed country-by-country, according to available resources and pre-existing relationships with partners. As such, arrangements for national partner security are very ad hoc, with some able to access vehicles and communications equipment and some offered training (particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan), but others operating in similar contexts receiving no additional security support. Attempts to provide locally appropriate assets (such as rented local vehicles rather than four wheel drives, and local mobile phones rather than radio equipment) so as not to raise the organisation’s profile, are examples of good practice, which could be more widely adopted.

A wider concern regarding collaborating with national organisations is how resources for security are allocated, largely through inter-agency mechanisms. The security budgets of UN agencies and NGOs come predominantly from within their bilateral programme or project grants. Increasingly, the UN has tried to utilise the consolidated appeals process and other common financing tools such as the CERF to raise security funds collectively, although this has so far shown very limited returns. In both cases, the funds remain largely in the hands of the appealing agencies and the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS). When local partner organisations are contracted, the international security resources do not appear to filter downward and outward to their implementing partners on the ground.

The role of security coordination fora in supporting national partners

A range of important security coordination fora have emerged in recent years, including the UN-NGO collaborative effort of Saving Lives Together (SLT), as well as context-specific security platforms such as ANSO (Afghanistan) and GANSO (Gaza). While these are all, in theory, useful mechanisms for extending coordination and support to national partners, there is not much evidence of it happening in practice. SLT is broadly understood to be a mechanism to support the implementing partners of UN agencies, but UNDSS notes that bringing all agencies under the SLT framework is not possible, and participating INGOs have the...
responsibility to channel the benefits of SLT down to their national partners, rather than directly benefiting themselves. Increasingly national NGOs are collaborating directly with UN agencies and in these cases SLT should apply, although UNDSS highlights the need for caution regarding the way in which national partners automatically become involved in in-country security coordination, particularly where the host government imposes strict controls on national staff access to security information. To address the issues of how SLT applies to INGOs and their national partners, some NGOs have proposed to develop an NGO version of the SLT framework that would provide the terms and conditions of security management support between INGOs and their implementing partners, including guidance on the responsibilities, obligations and expectations of each organisation.

2.7 Humanitarian principles: Operational interpretations and applications by national aid actors

The question of whether and how national humanitarian organisations and staffers can uphold humanitarian principles in highly contested contexts is an increasingly important issue given international organisations’ reliance on these actors to operate, often without significant monitoring or support. International staff interviewees in this and past studies have questioned the ability of their national staff to uphold principles when under extreme pressures in conflict settings, and the utility in asking them to do so. Agencies often present this as one of their primary concerns when switching to a remote management mode of operations, particularly in contexts where there is a strong authoritarian state (Stoddard, Harmer and Renouf 2009). Prior to this survey, exploring national staff perspectives on humanitarian principles has not been done in any systematic way at an inter-agency level. In the survey, we asked two questions: first, whether their organisation actively promoted the principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality – respondents overwhelmingly answered in the affirmative (94 per cent) and, second, whether doing so enhanced the security of national aid workers – 96 per cent said yes. These questions received larger majorities than any other.

Survey questions regarding humanitarian principles

• Does your organisation actively promote humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality in its operations?
• Does an organisation’s adherence to humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality help to enhance the security of national aid workers?

While a small number of respondents qualified their ‘yes’ response with a caveat, the strength of the positive responses signals an important and previously under valued perspective on not only the practical usefulness of the principles, but also their role in keeping national aid workers safe in insecure conditions across different cultural settings. Conversely, when asked what factors contribute to insecurity, the lack of respect for principles was the third-largest contributor to insecurity (out of seven) in the opinion of respondents, following ‘incompetent organisations taking unnecessary risks’ and ‘lack of experience and cultural awareness’.
An important additional finding from the survey was in how respondents perceived the levels of threat faced by different types of organisations. Institutionally, employment in UN agencies was deemed to carry more risk than other types of institutional affiliations, followed by Western INGOs, and religious organisations. This perception held across all contexts, except for oPt and Sri Lanka, where local organisations were considered to carry more risk. The finding highlights the challenges the UN faces in many complex political emergencies where it often has both a political and a military role, as well as a humanitarian one. At times, these roles can be in direct conflict with each other. The UN’s open and direct support to a government that is also waging war on insurgents, for example, undermines efforts to establish it as a neutral and impartial actor (Harvey et al. 2010).

The OCHA study reaffirmed that humanitarian principles provide the basis for warring parties to accept humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict. But, the study highlighted the range of challenges agencies face in promoting these principles, including political constraints imposed by host and donor governments. While simultaneously calling for respect for humanitarian principles, in the recent past many humanitarian organisations have also willingly compromised a principled approach in their own conduct by closely aligning with political and military activities and actors (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard 2010). These findings, combined with the importance national aid workers place on humanitarian principles, suggests that international organisations need to rigorously and systematically support all staff, but particularly local staff and partners, to imbed humanitarian principles in their day-to-day work in high-risk environments. This should involve ensuring that organisational policies and operational decision-making on issues such as funding, beneficiaries, modes of operation, and security measures are in line with humanitarian principles. This should also involve investing in communicating the organisation’s adherence to humanitarian principles at every level of the organisation, by all members of staff. Finally, it could also involve monitoring and reviewing operations in complex security environments on a regular basis to ensure compliance with humanitarian principles and to ensure that staff are receiving appropriate levels of support in achieving them (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard 2010).
3.1 Conclusions

In many countries, the operational presence of international aid organisations is often ‘international’ only in name and in the person of a handful of international staff, while host country nationals undertake very nearly all of the programme execution, management, administration and representation. This is increasingly true in some of the most violent contexts, where deteriorating conditions have forced international agencies to remotely manage their programmes. Even while many, particularly the largest, international aid organisations have made deliberate strides in nationalising their programming, a headquarters-country bias can still be seen throughout much of the sector. This manifests itself in greater headquarters support, including security resources, for international staff than for the bulk of the organisation’s staff in the field. Correcting this bias and more equitably and responsibly addressing the security needs of national aid actors will require a shift in both mindsets and resources. A few of the larger and better-endowed agencies have begun to make this shift, with security and other personnel policies starting to be developed specifically with national staff, as the majority of employees, in mind. Still, overall progress in security equitability for national staff has been slow and, for national partners, hardly yet begun.

3.2 Recommendations

The recommendations build on and complement those outlined in the broader OCHA study (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard 2010).

1. **Audit security resources and policies for national staff.** Agencies should undertake comprehensive and detailed auditing of their security resources for national staff to identify and address any inequities in security policies and supports. This should cover human resource policies such as insurance, medical care and access to stress and trauma counselling, as well as opportunities for training and skills development for operating in high risk environments.

2. **Strengthen explicit security support in agreements with local partners.** All international agencies should be proactive in assisting their local partners to determine their security support needs and provide the resources to meet those needs. Contracts and partnership instruments should include specific provisions for security plans and associated funding, including both hardware and training or capacity building requirements. UNDSS and agencies should coordinate to articulate security resource needs for operational partners and include them in consolidated appeals, particularly where the movement of UN agencies has been severely curtailed.
3. **Prioritise national participation in field-based security platforms and security coordination.** The UN and non-UN operational agencies should increase efforts to ensure the participation of national aid organisations in security coordination platforms and mechanisms (such as SLT). This should include drafting guidelines for cooperation, performing joint training exercises in the field, ensuring meetings are carried out or translated into the national language and offering information and analysis that is inclusive of, and relevant to, the operational needs of local aid workers, as well as ensuring a two-way information flow.

4. **Engage in ongoing dialogue with staff on risk perceptions and humanitarian principles.** Agencies should systematically monitor and discuss the differing perceptions of risk among all their staff. Risk assessments and regular security discussions should aim to reach greater understanding and consensus on security risks common to all, as well as those specific to international versus national staff, and to men versus women. Within this dialogue, agencies should work to forge a common understanding of humanitarian principles as they relate to practical operations for secure access and promote a shared commitment to adherence to these principles and to universal safety and security precautions.

5. **Increase donor support for national aid worker security.** Donors should support investments aimed at skillset development and duty of care to national staff and support the strengthening of national partnerships. Donor grant and funding mechanisms could require grantees to ensure that all subcontractors and implementing partners have established security plans and resources.
NOTE ON DATA DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGY

Incident data

The Aid Worker Security Database compiles the incidents cited in this report on an ongoing basis by systematically monitoring public reports, and augmented and verified by information provided directly from organisations and field-level security consortia. Incident reports are crosschecked and verified with the relevant agencies on a quarterly basis. The latest, unverified incidents are provided on the online database with the qualification that the numbers are provisional and may change.

Parameters and definitions. ‘Major incidents’ are defined as killings, kidnappings and armed attacks that result in serious injury. ‘Aid workers’ are defined as the employees and associated personnel (both national and international staff) of not-for-profit aid agencies that provide material and technical assistance in humanitarian relief contexts. Personnel include various locally contracted staff (for transportation, security, etc.). Agencies include both relief and multi-mandated (relief and development) organisations: NGOs, the International Movement of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, donor agencies and the UN agencies belonging to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO), as well as IOM and UNRWA. The aid worker definition does not include UN peacekeeping personnel, human rights workers, election monitors or those working for purely political, religious, or advocacy organisations.

In addition, the research quantifies and tracks the population of aid workers in the field over time. By gathering staffing figures from the major humanitarian organisations, and using a formula to impute these figures where the data are not available, the study is able to estimate the number of humanitarian workers in the field globally, from which it calculates incident rates.

National aid worker survey

The web-based survey of national aid workers was conducted under the OCHA study on operating in complex environments. It consisted of 27 mostly closed-ended questions, and gave respondents the option to elaborate further with written comments. It was launched July 2010 in English, French, Spanish and Arabic. The survey was disseminated globally but with an emphasis on the highest-risk countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan. The survey, which remained open after the OCHA study was finalised, ultimately garnered 1,181 respondents – and thus reached a greater number of nationals than are typically represented in research, even with extensive fieldwork. To ensure maximum honesty, respondents were anonymous, with the only requirement that they identify their type of institutional affiliation (UN agency, INGO, national NGO, host government, etc.). Respondents were primarily comprised of UN national staffers (66 per cent), and INGO national staffers (30 per cent), with the small remainder representing host country NGOs and national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies.
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